Password-based authenticated key exchange (PAKE) are protocols which are designed to be secure even when the secret key used for authentication is a human-memorable password. In this paper, we consider PAKE protocols in the three-party scenario, in which the users trying to establish a common secret do not share a password between themselves but only with a trusted server. Towards our goal, we recall some of the existing security notions for PAKE protocols and introduce new ones that are more suitable to the case of generic constructions of three-party protocols. We then present a natural generic construction of a three-party PAKE protocol from any two-party PAKE protocol and prove its security. To the best of our knowledge, the new protocol is the first provably-secure PAKE protocol in the three-party setting.
Introduction
Motivation. A fundamental problem in cryptography is how to communicate securely over an insecure channel, which might be controlled by an adversary. It is common in this scenario for two parties to encrypt and authenticate their messages in order to protect the privacy and authenticity of these messages. One way of doing so is to use public-key encryption and signatures, but the cost associated with these primitives may be too high for certain applications. Another way of addressing this problem is for users to first establish a common secret key via a key exchange protocol and then use this key to derive keys for symmetric encryption and message authentication schemes.
In practice, one finds several flavors of key exchange protocols, each with its own benefits and drawbacks. Among the most popular ones is the 3-party Kerberos authentication system [26] . Another one is the 2-party SIGMA protocol [20] used as the basis for the signature-based modes the necessary information to mount an off-line dictionary attack against each other simply by eavesdropping on the messages that are sent out by the server. More specifically, A and B can respectively learn the values X ⋆ S = E P W B (X S ) and Y ⋆ S = E P W A (Y S ) and mount a dictionary attack against each other using the fact that X S = X A and Y S = Y B . Despite being also possible in the case of 2-party protocols (see [12] ), insider attacks seem easier to mount in the 3-party scenario and thus must be taken into account. Figure 1: A 3-party password-based encrypted key exchange protocol that is insecure against insider attacks. E pw and D pw represent, respectively, the encryption and decryption algorithms of a cipher, such as AES [3] , using the password pw as the encryption and decryption key.
A new security model. In order to analyze the security of 3-party password-based authenticated key exchange protocols, we put forward a new security model and define two notions of security: indistinguishability of the session key and key privacy with respect to the server. The first of these notions is the usual one and is a straight-forward generalization of the equivalent notion in the 2-party password-based authenticated key exchange model. The second one is new and particular to the new setting, and captures the privacy of the key with respect to the trusted server to which all passwords are known.
A generic construction. In this paper, we consider a generic construction of a 3-party password-based protocol. Our construction is a natural one, building upon existing 2-party password-based key exchange and 3-party symmetric key distribution schemes, to achieve provable security in the strongest sense. Moreover, our construction is also modular in the sense that it can be broken into two parts, a 3-party password-based key distribution protocol and 2-party authenticated key exchange. The second part is only needed if key privacy with respect to the server is required.
The need for new security notions. Surprisingly, the proof of security for the new scheme does not seem to follow from the usual security notions for the underlying schemes as one would expect and seems to require a new and stronger notion of security for the underlying 2-party password-based scheme (see Section 2) . In fact, this new security notion is not specific to password-based schemes and is one of the main contributions of this paper. Fortunately, we observe that most existing 2-party password-based schemes do in fact satisfy this new property [14, 17, 19, 22] . More specifically, only a few small changes are required in their proof in order to achieve security in the new model. The bounds obtained in their proof remain essentially unchanged.
Contributions. In this paper, we consider password-based key exchange with implicit authentication in the 3-party model, where each user only shares a password with a trusted server.
New security models. Towards our goal, we put forth a new formal security model that is appropriate for the 3-party password-based authenticated key exchange scenario and give precise definitions of what it means for it to be secure. Our model builds upon those of Bellare and Rogaway [9, 10] for key distribution schemes and that of Bellare, Pointcheval, and Rogaway [7] for password-based authenticated key exchange.
New security notions. We also present a new and stronger model for 2-party authenticated key exchange protocols, which we call the Real-Or-Random model. Our new model is provably stronger than the existing model, to which we refer to as the Find-Then-Guess model, in the sense that a scheme proven secure in the new model is also secure in the existing model. However, the reverse is not necessarily true due to an unavoidable non-constant factor loss in the reduction. Such losses in the reduction are extremely important in the case of password-based protocols.
In addition to the indistinguishability of the session key, we present a new property, called key privacy, which is specific to 3-party key exchange protocols. This new notion captures in a quantitative way the idea that the session key shared between two instances should only be known to these two instances and no one else, including the trusted server.
A generic construction in the standard model. We present a generic and natural framework for constructing a 3-party password-based authenticated key exchange protocol from any secure 2-party password-based one. We do so by combining a 3-party key distribution scheme, an authenticated Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol, and the 2-party password-based authenticated key exchange protocol. The proof of security relies solely on the security properties of underlying primitives it uses and does not assume the Random Oracle model [8] . Hence, when appropriately instantiated, this construction yields a secure protocol in the standard model.
Related Work. Password-based authenticated key exchange has been extensively studied in the last few years, in various environments. The seminal work in this area is the encrypted key exchange protocol by Bellovin and Merritt [11] , in which two users execute an encrypted version of the Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol [16] . In their protocol, each flow is encrypted using the password shared between these two users as the symmetric key. Unfortunately, due to the lack of a proper security model, no formal security analysis was presented for their protocol.
The first formal security model for authenticated key exchange protocols between two parties was introduced by Bellare and Rogaway [9] . The latter has been extended to the password-based setting [7, 13] , with security analyses of the above 2-party password-based key exchange, under idealized assumptions, such as the random oracle and the ideal cipher models. Password-based schemes, provably secure in the standard model, have been recently proposed [19, 18, 17] , but only for two parties. Only few papers [15, 21, 27] have considered password-based protocols in the 3-party setting, but none of their schemes enjoys provable security. In fact, our generic construction seems to be the first provably-secure 3-party password-based authenticated key exchange protocol.
Another related line of research is authenticated key exchange in the 3-party setting. The first work in this area is the protocol of Needham and Schroeder [23] , which inspired the Kerberos distributed system [26] . Later, Bellare and Rogaway introduced a formal security model in this scenario along with a construction of the first provably-secure symmetric-key-based key distribution scheme [10] . In this paper, we consider the special but important case in which the secret keys are drawn from a small set of values.
Organization. In Section 2, we recall the existing security model for 2-party password-based authenticated key exchange and introduce a new one. Next, in Section 3, we introduce new models for 3-party password-based authenticated key exchange. Then, in Section 4, we relate the new security notions being introduced in this paper to some of the existing ones. Section 5 then presents our generic construction of a 3-party password-based authenticated key exchange protocol, called GPAKE, along with the security claims and suggestions on how to instantiate it. The proofs of security for GPAKE are given in Section 6. We conclude this paper by presenting some future extensions of this work in Section 7.
2 Security models for 2-party password-based key exchange A secure 2-party password-based key exchange (2PAKE) is a protocol where the parties use their password in order to derive a common session key sk that will be used to build secure channels. Loosely speaking, such protocols are said to be secure against dictionary attacks if the advantage of an attacker in distinguishing a real session key from a random key is less than O(n/|D|) + ε(k) where |D| is the size of the dictionary D, n is the number of active sessions and ε(k) is a negligible function depending on the security parameter k.
In this section, we recall the security model for 2-party password-based authenticated key exchange protocols introduced by Bellare, Pointcheval, and Rogaway (BPR) [7] and introduce a new one. For reasons that will soon become apparent, we refer to the new model as the Real-Or-Random (ROR) model and to the BPR model as the Find-Then-Guess (FTG) model, following the terminology of Bellare et al. for symmetric encryption schemes [5] .
Communication model
Protocol participants. Each participant in the 2-party password-based key exchange is either a client C ∈ C or a server S ∈ S. The set of all users or participants U is the union C ∪ S.
Long-lived keys. Each client C ∈ C holds a password pw C . Each server S ∈ S holds a vector pw S = pw C C∈C with an entry for each client. pw C and pw S are also called the long-lived keys of client C and server S.
Protocol execution. The interaction between an adversary A and the protocol participants occurs only via oracle queries, which model the adversary capabilities in a real attack. During the execution, the adversary may create several concurrent instances of a participant. These queries are as follows, where U i denotes the instance i of a participant U :
• Execute(C i , S j ): This query models passive attacks in which the attacker eavesdrops on honest executions between a client instance C i and a server instance S j . The output of this query consists of the messages that were exchanged during the honest execution of the protocol.
• Send(U i , m): This query models an active attack, in which the adversary may intercept a message and then either modify it, create a new one, or simply forward it to the intended participant. The output of this query is the message that the participant instance U i would generate upon receipt of message m.
Security definitions
Partnering. As in [7] , we use the notion of partnering based on session identifiers (sid) and partner identifiers (pid). More specifically, let the session identifier of a client or server instance be a function of all the messages sent and received by that instance as specified by the key exchange protocol. Let the partner identifier of a client or server instance be the instance with which a common secret key is to be established. Then, two instances U i 1 and U . In practice, the sid can be taken to be the partial transcript of the conversation between the client and the server instances before the acceptance.
Freshness. In order to properly formalize security notions for the session key, one has to be careful to avoid cases in which adversary can trivially break the security of the scheme. For example, an adversary who is trying to distinguish the session key of an instance U i from a random key can trivially do so if it obtains the key for that instance through a Reveal query (see definition below) to instance U i or its partner. Instead of explicitly defining a notion of freshness and mandating the adversary to only perform tests on fresh instances as in previous work, we opted to embed that notion inside the definition of the oracles.
Indistinguishability in the Find-Then-Guess model. This is the definition currently being used in the literature. In order to measure the indistinguishability of the session key of user instance, the adversary is given access to two additional oracles: the Reveal oracle, which models the misuse of session keys by a user, and the Test oracle, which tries to capture the adversary's ability (or inability) to tell apart a real session key from a random one. Let b be a bit chosen uniformly at random at the beginning of the experiment defining indistinguishability in the Find-Then-Guess (FTG) model. These oracles are defined as follows.
• Reveal(U i ): If a session key is not defined for instance U i or if a Test query was asked to either U i or to its partner, then return ⊥. Otherwise, return the session key held by the instance U i .
• Test(U i ): If no session key for instance U i is defined or if a Reveal query was asked to either U i or to its partner, then return the undefined symbol ⊥. Otherwise, return the session key for instance U i if b = 1 or a random key from the same domain if b = 0.
The adversary in this case is allowed to ask multiple queries to the Execute, Reveal, and Send oracles, but it is restricted to ask only a single query to the Test oracle. The goal of the adversary is to guess the value of the hidden bit b used by the Test oracle. The adversary is considered successful if it guesses b correctly. Let Succ denote the event in which the adversary is successful. The ftg-ake-advantage of an adversary A in violating the indistinguishability of the protocol P in the FTG sense and the advantage function of the protocol P , when passwords are drawn from a dictionary D, are respectively
where the maximum is over all A with time-complexity at most t and using resources at most R (such as the number of queries to its oracles). The definition of time-complexity that we use henceforth is the usual one, which includes the maximum of all execution times in the experiments defining the security plus the code size of the adversary [1] . Note that the advantage of an adversary that simply guesses the bit b is 0 in the above definition due to the rescaling of the probabilities.
We say a 2-party password-based key exchange protocol P is secure in the FTG sense if the advantage Adv ftg−ake P,D is only negligibly larger than kn/|D|, where n is number of active sessions and k is a constant. A session is said to be active if it involves Send queries by the adversary. We note that k = 1 in the best scenario one can expect since an adversary that simply guesses the password and plays the role of a given user via Send queries has an advantage of n/|D|.
In order to guarantee that security definitions are actually meaningful in practice, we assume henceforth that the size of the key space from which the session key is sampled is at least superpolynomial in the security parameter.
Indistinguishability in the Real-Or-Random model. This is a new definition. In the Real-Or-Random (ROR) model, we only allow the adversary to ask Execute, Send, and Test queries. In other words, the Reveal oracle that exists in the FTG model is no longer available to the adversary. Instead, we allow the adversary to ask as many Test queries as it wants to different instances. All Test queries in this case will be answered using the same value for the hidden bit b that was chosen at the beginning . That is, the keys returned by the Test oracle are either all real or all random. However, in the random case, the same random key value should be returned for Test queries that are asked to two instances which are partnered. P lease note that the Test oracle is the oracle modeling the misuse of keys by a user in this case. The goal of the adversary is still the same: to guess the value of the hidden bit b used to answer Test queries. The adversary is considered successful if it guesses b correctly.
Let Succ denote the event in which the adversary is successful. The ror-ake-advantage of an adversary A in violating the indistinguishability of the protocol P in the ROR sense, Adv (t, R) of the protocol P are then defined as in the previous definition.
As in FTG case, we say a 2-party password-based key exchange protocol P is secure in the ROR sense if the advantage Adv ftg−ake P,D is only negligibly larger than kn/|D|, where n is number of active sessions and k is a constant.
Relation between notions. As we prove in Section 4, the Real-Or-Random (ROR) security model is actually stronger than the Find-Then-Guess (FTG) security model, assuming that constant factor losses in the security reduction are acceptable. More specifically, we show that proofs of security in the ROR model can be easily translated into proofs of security in the FTG model with only a 2 factor loss in the reduction (see Lemma 4.1). The reverse, however, is not necessarily true since the reduction is not security preserving. There is a loss of non-constant factor in the reduction (see Lemma 4.2) . Moreover, the loss in the reduction cannot be avoided as there exist schemes for which we can prove such a loss in security exists (see Proposition 4.3).
To better understand the gap between the two notions, imagine a password-based scheme that was proven secure in the FTG model. By definition, the advantage of any adversary is at most O(n/|D|) + ε(k), where n is the number of active sessions and ε(k) is a negligible term. By applying the reduction, we can show that no adversary can do better than O(n 2 /|D|) + n · ε(k), which is not enough to guarantee the security of the same scheme in the ROR model. Note that such a gap is not as important in the case where high-entropy keys are used since both terms in the expression would be negligible.
As a consequence, we cannot take for granted the security of the existing schemes and new proofs of security need be provided. Fortunately, we would like to point out here that the security proof for several of the existing schemes can be easily modified to meet the new security goals with essentially the same bounds. The reason for that is that the security proofs of most existing password-based schemes in fact prove something stronger than what is required by the security model. More specifically, most proofs generally show that not only the session key being tested looks random, but all the keys that may be involved in a reveal query also look random to an adversary that does not know the secret password, thus satisfying the security requirements of our new model. In particular, this is the case for the KOY protocol [19] and its generalization [17] , and some other schemes based on the encrypted key exchange scheme of Bellovin and Merritt [11] (e.g., [14, 22] ).
Since most existing password-based schemes do seem to achieve security in the new and stronger security model and since the latter appears to be more applicable to situations in which one wishes to use a password-based key exchange protocol as a black box, we suggest the use of our new model when proving the security of new password-based schemes.
Relation to simulation models. In [24] , the Find-Then-Guess model of [10] is shown to be equivalent to simulation models in the sense that a scheme that is proven secure in one model is also secure in the other model. By closely examining their proof, one can easily see that the equivalence does not apply to the case of password-based protocols due to the non-securitypreserving reduction. It seems, however, that their proof of equivalence can be adapted to show the equivalence between the simulation model and the Real-Or-Random model that we introduce in this paper in the case of password-based protocols.
3 Security models for 3-party password-based key exchange
In this section, we put forward new formal security models for 3-party password-authenticated key exchange and key distribution protocols. Our models are generalizations of the model of Bellare and Rogaway [10] for 3-party key distribution schemes to the password case and that of Bellare, Pointcheval, and Rogaway [7] for 2-party password-based authenticated key exchange.
Protocol Syntax
Protocol participants. Each participant in a 3-party password-based key exchange is either a client U ∈ U or a trusted server S ∈ S. The set of clients U is made up of two disjoint sets: C, the set of honest clients, and E, the set of malicious clients. For simplicity, and without loss of generality 1 , we assume the set S to contain only a single trusted server.
The inclusion of the malicious set E among the participants is one of the main differences between the 2-party and the 3-party models. Despite being also important in the 2-party model (see [12] ), the inclusion of malicious users seems to be essential in the 3-party model as insider attacks appear to be a more realistic threat.
Long-lived keys. As in the 2-party case, each client C ∈ C holds a password pw C and each server S ∈ S holds a vector pw S = pw C C∈C with an entry for each client. The only difference with respect to the 2-party case is that the set of passwords pw E , where E ∈ E, is assumed to be known by the adversary.
Communication model
The interaction between an adversary A and the protocol participants occurs only via oracle queries, which model the adversary capabilities in a real attack. These queries are as follows:
2 ): This query models passive attacks in which the attacker eavesdrops on honest executions among the client instances U i 1 1 and U i 2 2 and trusted server instance S j . The output of this query consists of the messages that were exchanged during the honest execution of the protocol.
• SendClient(U i , m): This query models an active attack, in which the adversary may intercept a message and then modify it, create a new one, or simply forward it to the intended client. The output of this query is the message that client instance U i would generate upon receipt of message m.
• SendServer(S j , m): This query models an active attack against a server. It outputs the message that server instance S j would generate upon receipt of message m.
Indistinguishability
The security definitions presented here build upon those of Bellare and Rogaway [9, 10] and that of Bellare, Pointcheval, and Rogaway [7] .
Notation. Following [9, 10] , we say an instance U i has accepted if it goes into an accept mode after receiving the last expected protocol message.
Partnering. The definition of partnering in the 3-party setting is similar to the one given in the 2-party setting and is thus omitted here. We note, however, that, in order to guarantee that all participants in the same session end up with the same session identifier, the forwarding of messages may be required.
Freshness. As in the 2-party case, we opted to embed the notion of freshness inside the definition of the oracles.
Indistinguishability in Find-Then-Guess model. This definition we give here is the straight-forward generalization of that of Bellare, Pointcheval, and Rogaway [7] for the 2-party case, combined with ideas of the model of Bellare and Rogaway [10] for 3-party key distribution. As in the 2-party case, we also define a Reveal oracle to model the misuse of session keys and a Test oracle to capture the adversary's ability to distinguish a real session key from a random one. Let b be a bit chosen uniformly at random at the beginning of the experiment defining indistinguishability in the FTG model. These oracles are defined as follows:
• Test(U i ): If no session key is defined for instance U i or if the intended partner of U i is part of the malicious set or if a Reveal query was asked to either U i or to its partner, then return the invalid symbol ⊥. Otherwise, return either the session key for instance U i if b = 1 or a random key from the same domain if b = 0.
Consider an execution of the key exchange protocol P by an adversary A, in which the latter is given access to the Reveal, Execute, SendClient, SendServer, and Test oracles and asks a single (t, R) of the protocol P are then defined as in previous definitions.
Like in the 2-party case, we say a 3-party password-based key exchange protocol P is secure in the FTG sense if the advantage Adv ftg−ake P,D is only negligibly larger than kn/|D|, where n is number of active sessions and k is a constant.
Indistinguishability in Real-Or-Random model. This is a new definition. In the ROR model, Reveal queries are no longer allowed and are replaced by Test queries. In this case, however, the adversary is allowed to ask as many Test queries as it wants.
The modifications to the Test oracle are as follows. If a Test query is asked to a client instance that has not accepted, then return the invalid symbol ⊥. If a Test query is asked to an instance of an honest client whose intended partner is dishonest or to an instance of a dishonest client, then return the real session key. Otherwise, the Test query returns either the real session key if b = 1 and a random one if b = 0, where b is the hidden bit selected at random prior to the first call. However, when b = 0, the same random key value should be returned for Test queries that are asked to two instances which are partnered. The goal of the adversary is still the same: to guess the value of the hidden bit used by the Test oracle. The adversary is considered successful if it guesses b correctly.
Consider an execution of the key exchange protocol P by an adversary A, in which the latter is given access to the Execute, SendClient, SendServer, and Test oracles, and outputs a guess bit b ′ . Such an adversary is said to win the experiment defining indistinguishability in the ROR sense if b ′ = b, where b is the hidden bit used by the Test oracle. Let Succ denote the event in which the adversary wins this game. The ror-ake-advantage Adv ror−ake P,D (A) of an adversary A in violating the indistinguishability of the protocol P in the ROR sense and the advantage function Adv ror−ake P,D (t, R) of the protocol P are then defined as in previous definitions.
Key privacy with respect to the server
Differently from previous work, we define the notion of key privacy to capture, in a quantitative way, the idea that the session key shared between two instances should only be known to these two instances and no one else, including the trusted server. The goal of this new notion is to limit the amount of trust put into the server. That is, even though we rely on the server to help clients establish session keys between themselves, we still want to guarantee the privacy of these session keys with respect to the server. In fact, this is the main difference between a key distribution protocol (in which the session key is known to the server) and a 3-party key exchange protocol (for which the session key remains unknown to the server).
In defining the notion of key privacy, we have in mind a server which knows the passwords for all users, but that behaves in an honest but curious manner. For this reason, we imagine an adversary who has access to all the passwords as well as to the Execute and SendClient oracles but not to a Reveal oracle or to a SendServer oracle. The reason for not providing the adversary with a SendServer oracle is because the latter can be easily simulated by the adversary using the passwords. The reason for not providing the adversary with a a Reveal oracle is because, in the definition of key privacy, we only consider sessions in which the key is shared between two oracle instances. For these sessions, to capture the adversary's ability to tell apart the real session key from a random one from the same domain, we introduce a new type of oracle, called TestPair. Let b is a bit chosen uniformly at random at the beginning of the experiment defining the notion of key privacy. The TestPair is defined as follows.
• TestPair(U i 1 , U Consider an execution of the key exchange protocol P by an adversary A in which the latter is given the passwords of all users and is allowed to ask multiple queries to its Execute, SendClient, and TestPair oracles. Let b ′ be its output. Such an adversary is said to win the experiment defining the key privacy if b ′ = b, where b is the hidden bit used by the TestPair oracle. Let Succ denote the event in which the adversary guesses b correctly. We can then define the kp-advantage Adv 
Relations between notions
In this section, we prove the relation between the Find-Then-Guess (FTG) and Real-Or-Random (ROR) notions of security for authenticated key exchange protocols. The relation is not specific to password-based schemes, but its implications are more important in that scenario.
Lemma 4.1 Let Adv
ftg−ake AKE (t, q send , q reveal , q exe ) represent the maximum advantage of an adversary in violating the indistinguishability of the protocol AKE in the FTG sense when the adversary has time-complexity at most t and asks at most q send queries to its Send oracle, q reveal queries to its Reveal oracle, and q exe queries to its Execute oracle. Let Adv ror−ake AKE (t, q send , q test , q exe ) represent the maximum advantage of an adversary in violating the indistinguishability of the protocol AKE in the ROR sense when the adversary has time-complexity at most t and asks at most q send queries to its Send oracle, q test queries to its Test oracle, and q exe queries to its Execute oracle. Then, for any protocol AKE, Adv ftg−ake AKE (t, q send , q reveal , q exe ) ≤ 2 · Adv ror−ake AKE (t, q send , q test , q exe ), where q test = q reveal + 1.
Proof: In order to prove this lemma, we show how to build an adversary A ror against the indistinguishability of an authenticated key exchange protocol, AKE, in the ROR model given an adversary A ftg against the indistinguishability of the same protocol AKE in the FTG model. We know that A ftg has time-complexity at most t and that it asks at most q send , q reveal , and q exe queries to its Send, Reveal, and Execute oracles, respectively.
The description of A ror is as follows. A ror starts by choosing a bit b uniformly at random and starts running A ftg . If A ftg asks a Send query, then A ror asks the corresponding query to its Send oracle. If A ftg asks a Execute query, then A ror asks the corresponding query to its Execute oracle. If A ftg asks a Reveal query, then A ror asks a Test query to its Test oracle and uses the answer it receives as the answer to the Reveal query. If A ftg asks a Test query, then A ror asks the corresponding query to its Test oracle. If b = 1, then A ror uses the answer it received as the answer to the Test query. Otherwise, it returns a random key to A ftg . Let b ′ be the final output of A ftg . If b ′ = b, then A ror outputs 1. Otherwise, it outputs 0.
Note that A ror has time-complexity at most t and asks at most q send , q reveal + 1, and q exe queries to its Send, Test, and Execute oracles, respectively.
In order to analyze the advantage of A ror , first consider the case in which its Test oracle returns random keys. It is easy to see that, in this case, A ftg cannot gain any information about the hidden bit b used to answer its single Test query. Therefore, the probability that A ror outputs 1 is exactly 1 2 . Now consider the case in which its Test oracle returns the actual sessions keys. In this case, the simulation of Reveal is perfect and A ror runs A ftg exactly as in the experiment defining the indistinguishability of A ftg in the FTG model. Therefore, the probability that A ror outputs 1 is exactly
The proof uses a standard hybrid argument, in which we define a sequence of q test + 1 hybrid experiments V i , where 0 ≤ i ≤ q test . In experiment V i , the first i queries to the Test oracle are answered using a random key and all remaining Test queries are answered using the real key. Please note that the hybrid experiments at the extremes correspond to the real and random experiments in the definition of indistinguishability in the ROR model. Hence, in order to prove the bound in the lemma, it suffices to prove that the difference in probability that adversary A ror returns 1 between any two consecutive experiments V i and V i−1 is at most Adv ftg−ake AKE (t, q send , q test − 1, q exe ). This is achieved by building a sequence of q test adversaries A i ftg , as described below. Let A i ftg be a distinguisher A i ftg for experiments V i and V i−1 , where 1 ≤ i ≤ q test . A i ftg starts running A ror answering to its queries as follows. If A ror asks a Send or Execute query, then A ftg answers it using its corresponding oracle. If A ror asks a Test query, then A ftg answers it with a random key if this query is among the first i − 1. If this is the i-th Test query, then A ftg uses its Test oracle to answer it. All remaining Test queries are answered using the output of the Reveal query. A ftg finishes its execution by outputting the same guess bit b outputted by A ror .
Note that A i ftg has time-complexity at most t and asks at most q send , q test − 1, and q exe queries to its Send, Reveal, and Execute oracles, respectively.
In order to analyze the advantage of A i ftg , first notice that when Test oracle returns a random key, A i ftg runs A ror exactly as in the experiment V i . Next, notice that when Test oracle returns the real key, A i ftg runs A ror exactly as in the experiment V i−1 . It follows that the difference in probability that adversary A ror returns 1 between experiments V i and V i−1 is at most Adv ftg−ake AKE (A ror ) ≤ Adv ftg−ake AKE (t, q send , q test − 1, q exe ). The lemma follows easily.
Even though the reduction in Lemma 4.2 is not security-preserving (i.e., there is a nonconstant factor loss in the reduction), it does not imply that a gap really exists-there might exist a tight reduction between the two notions that we have not yet found. In order to prove that the non-constant factor loss in the reduction is indeed intrinsic, we need to show that there exist schemes for which the gap does exist. To achieve this goal, one can use techniques similar to those used to prove that a gap exists between the Left-Or-Right and Find-Then-Guess notions of security for symmetric encryption schemes [5] . In that paper, they show how to construct a new symmetric encryption scheme E ′ from a secure encryption scheme E such that E ′ exhibits the gap. E ′ was constructed in such a way that its encryption function works like the encryption function of E most of the time, except in a few cases (which are easily identifiable) in which the ciphertext it generates contains the plaintext. The probability in which such bad cases happen in their construction is exactly 1/q, where q is the non-constant factor in the reduction. Using a similar technique, we can prove the following.
Proposition 4.3 The gap exhibited in Lemma 4.2 is intrinsic and cannot be avoided.
Proof Sketch: Let AKE be an authenticated key exchange protocol that is secure in the FTG model. For simplicity, let us assume that q test = 2 l , for some integer l, and that k is the length of the session key. Then, using AKE, we can construct a new scheme AKE ′ that exhibits the claimed gap as follows. AKE ′ simply runs AKE and sets its session key sk to the one generated by AKE whenever any of the first l bits of the latter are different from 0. When the first l bits of the session key generated by AKE are to 0, then AKE ′ simply sets all the bits of the session key sk to 0.
First, let us analyze the ROR security of AKE ′ . To this end, consider an adversary A ror against the ROR security of AKE ′ , which makes q exe = 2 l queries to its Execute oracle and q test = 2 l queries to its Test oracle and then outputs 1 if any of the outputs of the Test oracle is a string containing all zeros and returns 0, otherwise. Let b be the hidden bit used to simulate Test oracle. To analyze the success probability of AKE ′ , first notice that, if b = 0 (i.e., the Test oracle returns random keys), then the probability that the Test oracle returns the zero string is negligible if we assume that the session key length k is sufficiently larger than the parameter l. Thus, the probability that A ror returns 0 in this case is also negligible. Second, notice that if b = 1 (i.e., the Test oracle returns the actual session keys), then the probability that the Test oracle returns the zero string is greater than 1/2. This is because the probability that the first l bits of each session key sk generated by AKE are equal to 0 is close to 1/2 l due to the security of the underlying protocol AKE. As a result, the probability that at least one of q test = 2 l session keys computed by AKE ′ is equal to zero string (in which case A ror succeeds) is close to 1 − (1 − q test ) qtest ≈ 1 − 1/e ≥ 1/2, where e is the base of the natural logarithm. Therefore, the ror-ake-advantage of A ror and the ror-ake-advantage function of the protocol AKE ′ is at least 1/2. Second, let us analyze the FTG security of AKE ′ . To do so, we note that an adversary against the FTG security of AKE ′ must hope that the first l bits of the challenge session key that it receives from its Test oracle are equal to zero. Otherwise, this adversary cannot achieve an advantage that is greater than that of an adversary attacking the underlying AKE. Since the first l bits of the challenge session key are equal to zero with probability close to 1/2 l , it follows that Adv ftg−ake AKE ′ (t, q send , q reveal , q exe ) ≤ Adv ftg−ake AKE (t, q send , q reveal , q exe ) + 1/2 l .
Finally, we observe that, since we started with a protocol AKE that is secure in the FTG sense, the value Adv ftg−ake AKE (t, q send , q reveal , q exe ) should be negligible in comparison to 1/2 l . As a result, the ratio between the ror-ake-advantage and the ftg-ake-advantage of the protocol AKE ′ necessarily contains a non-constant factor that is proportional to the number of queries to the Test oracle.
We note that, when the underlying scheme AKE is a password-based key exchange, not every choice of parameters yields the result claimed in the proposition due to the fact Adv ftg−ake AKE (t, q send , q reveal , q exe ) usually contains non-negligible terms. However, since there are choices of parameters and schemes for which the gap does exist, that is already sufficient for the purpose of the proposition.
Finally, it is also worth pointing out that the protocol AKE ′ used to exhibit the gap in Lemma 4.2 cannot be considered secure in the FTG model. This fact, however, does not invalidate the proof of Proposition 4.3.
A generic three-party password-based protocol
In this section, we introduce a generic construction of a 3-party password-based key exchange protocol in the scenario in which we have an honest-but-curious server. It combines a 2-party password-based key exchange, a secure key distribution protocol, and a 2-party MAC-based key exchange and has several attractive features. First, our construction does not rely on the Random Oracle (RO) model [8] as long as the underlying primitives themselves do not rely on it. Hence, by using schemes such as the KOY protocol [19] for the 2-party password-based key exchange and the 3-party key distribution scheme in [10] , one gets a 3-party passwordbased protocol whose security is in the standard model. Second, if 2-party password-based key exchange protocols already exist between the server and its users in a distributed system, they can be re-used in the construction of our 3-party password-based key exchange.
Building blocks
In this section, we recall the definitions for the cryptographic primitives that we use in the construction of our generic 3-party password-based authenticated key exchange, GPAKE.
Decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption: DDH. The decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption, DDH, states, roughly, that the distributions (g u , g v , g uv ) and (g u , g v , g w ) are computationally indistinguishable when u, v, w are drawn at random from {1, . . . , |G|}. This can be made more precise by defining two experiments, Exp ddh-real G (A) and Exp ddh-rand G (A). In both experiments, we compute two values U = g u and V = g v to be given to A. But in addition to that, we also provide a third input, which is g uv in Exp Message authentication codes (MAC). Let ℓ be a security parameter and let sk be a ℓ-bit secret key uniformly distributed in {0, 1} ℓ . A message authentication code MAC = (Tag, Ver) is defined by the following two algorithms: (1) A MAC generation algorithm Tag, possibly probabilistic, which given a message m and a secret key sk ∈ {0, 1} ℓ , produces a tag µ; and (2) A MAC verification algorithm Ver, which given a tag µ, a message m, and a secret key sk , outputs 1 if µ is a valid tag for m under sk and 0, otherwise.
The security notion that we need for the MAC scheme is strong existential unforgeability under chosen-message attacks, which is based on existential unforgeability notion in [6] . In this notion, the adversary should be unable to create a new valid message-tag pair, even after seeing many such valid pairs. More specifically, let MAC be a MAC scheme, let sk be a secret key chosen uniformly at random from {0, 1} ℓ , and let A be an adversary against the 3-party key distribution. A secure key distribution protocol KD is a 3-party protocol between 2 parties and a trusted server S where S picks a session key at random and securely sends it to the users. The security model, formally introduced in [10] , is a generalization of that for 2-party authenticated key exchange protocols, to which a new oracle was added to represent the trusted server. Their security is in the Find-Then-Guess (FTG) model, using the terminology that we introduced for key exchange protocols.
In our generic construction, we only need a KD secure with respect to a single session since the symmetric keys used as input to the key distribution protocol differ from session to session. They are the session keys obtained from the 2-party password-based authenticated key exchange protocols between the server and each of the two parties. Since in this case, both the FTG and the ROR notions are equivalent, we opted to use their definition (i.e. FTG) adapted to our terminology. That is, we define Adv 
Description of the generic solution
Our generic construction can be seen as a form of compiler transforming any secure 2-party password-based key exchange protocol P into a secure password-based 3-party key exchange protocol P ′ in the honest-but-curious security model using a secure key distribution KD, a secure MAC scheme, and generic number-theoretic operations in a group G for which the DDH assumption holds (see Section 5.1).
The compiler, depicted in Figure 2 , works as follows. First, we use the protocol P between a user A and the server S to establish a secure high-entropy session key sk A . Second, we use the protocol P between the server S and the user B in order to establish a session key sk B . Third, using a key distribution KD, we have the server S first select a MAC key k m , using the key generation of the latter, and then distribute this key to A and B using the session keys sk A and sk B , respectively, generated in the first two steps. Finally, A and B use a MAC-based key exchange to establish a session key CDH in an authenticated way.
Security
Indistinguishability in the Real-Or-Random model. As the following theorem states, the generic scheme GPAKE depicted in Figure 2 is a secure 3-party password-based key exchange protocol as long as the Decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption holds in G and the underlying primitives it uses are secure. The proof of security, however, is not as tight as one would wish, due to the loss of a factor 2 in the reduction.
Theorem 5.1 Let 2PAKE be a secure 2-party password-based Key Exchange, KD be a secure key distribution, and MAC be a secure MAC algorithm. Let q exe and q test represent the number of queries to Execute and Test oracles, and let q A send , q B send , q kd , and q ake represent the number of queries to the SendClient and SendServer oracles with respect to each of the two 2PAKE protocols, the KD protocol, and the final AKE protocol. Then,
where τ e denotes the exponentiation computational time in G.
Key privacy with respect to the server. As the following theorem states, the generic scheme GPAKE depicted in Figure 2 has key privacy with respect to the server as long as the Decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption holds in G.
Theorem 5.2 Let GPAKE be the 3-party password-based authenticated key exchange scheme depicted in Figure 2 . Then,
where the parameters are defined as in Theorem 5.1.
Instantiations
Several practical schemes can be used in the instantiation of the 2-party password-based key exchange of our generic construction. Among them are the KOY protocol [19] and its generalization [17] , the PAK suite [22] , and several other schemes based on the encrypted key exchange scheme of Bellovin and Merritt [11] (e.g., [14] ).
In the instantiation of the key distribution scheme, one could use the original proposal in [10] or any other secure key distribution scheme. In particular, the server could use a chosenciphertext secure symmetric encryption scheme to distribute the keys to the users. Independently of the choice, one should keep in mind that the security requirements for the key distribution scheme are very weak. It only needs to provide security with respect to one session.
For the instantiation of the MAC, any particular choice that makes the MAC term in Theorem 5.1 negligible will do. Possible choices are the HMAC [4] or the CBC MAC.
It is important to notice that, in order for GPAKE to be secure, the underlying 2-party password-based protocol must be secure in the ROR model. In view of the computational gap that exists between the ROR and the FTG models (see Proposition 4.3), a 2-party passwordbased secure in the FTG model does not suffice to prove the security of GPAKE.
6 Proof of security for GPAKE Indistinguishability of GPAKE in the ROR model. For simplicity, we assume the set of honest users contains only users A and B. The solution can be easily extended to the more general case with essentially the same bounds.
Let A be an adversary against the indistinguishability of GPAKE in the Real-Or-Random sense with time-complexity at most t, and asking at most q exe queries to its Execute oracle, q test queries to its Test oracle, q A send queries to SendClient and SendServer oracles with respect to the 2PAKE protocol between A and the trusted server S, q B send queries with respect to the 2PAKE protocol between B and S, q kd queries with respect to the KD protocol, and q ake queries with respect to the final authenticated key exchange protocol.
Our proof consists of a sequence of hybrid experiments, starting with the real attack against GPAKE scheme and ending in an experiment in which the adversary's advantage is 0, and for which we can bound the difference in the adversary's advantage between any two consecutive experiments. For each experiment Exp n , we define an event Succ n corresponding to the case in which the adversary correctly guesses the hidden bit b involved in the Test queries (see Section 3). Experiment Exp 1 . We now modify the simulation of the oracles as follows. We replace the session key sk A used as input to the KD protocol by a random session key sk ′ A in all of the sessions. As the following lemma shows, the difference between the success probability of the adversary A between the current and previous experiments is at most twice the probability of breaking the security of the underlying 2PAKE protocol between A and S.
Experiment Exp
. Proof: Let A 1 be a distinguisher for experiments Exp 1 and Exp 0 . We can build an adversary A pake against the indistinguishability of the 2PAKE protocol between A and S using A 1 as follows. A pake starts by choosing a bit b uniformly at random and selecting the passwords for all users in the system except A according to the distribution of D. Next, it starts running A 1 , giving it the passwords for all the malicious clients in the system, and answering to its oracle queries as follows.
• SendClient and SendServer queries. If A 1 asks a SendClient or SendServer query pertaining to an instance of the 2PAKE protocol between B and S, then A pake can answer it using the password of client B that it has picked at the beginning of its execution. If the SendClient or SendServer query pertains to an instance of the 2PAKE protocol between A and S, then A pake can answer it by asking the corresponding query to its Send oracle. If this query forces the given instance of client A or S to accept, then we also ask a Test query to that instance (unless Test query had already been asked to its partner). The output of this Test query will be used as the session key shared between A and S. All remaining SendClient and SendServer queries by A 1 can be easily answered either using the chosen values for the session key shared between A and S or the session keys computed in the execution of the 2PAKE protocol between S and B.
• Execute queries. A pake can easily answer these queries using its own Execute oracle and the output of the Test queries, as in the simulation of SendClient and SendServer queries.
• Test queries. A pake can easily answer these queries using the bit b that it has previously selected and the session keys that it has computed.
Let b ′ be the output of A 1 . If b ′ = b, then A pake outputs 1. Otherwise, it outputs 0.
One can easily see that the probability that A pake outputs 1 when its Test oracle returns real keys is exactly the probability that A 1 correctly guesses the hidden bit b in experiment Exp 0 (i.e., Pr[ Succ 0 ]). Similarly, the probability that A pake outputs 1 when its Test oracle returns random keys is exactly the probability that A 1 correctly guesses the hidden bit b in experiment Exp 1 (i.e., Pr[ Succ 1 ]). The lemma follows by noticing that A pake has at most time-complexity t and asks at most q exe + q A send queries to its Test oracle, at most q exe queries to its Execute oracle, and at most q A send queries to its Send oracle.
Experiment Exp 2 . We modify the previous experiment by replacing the session key sk B used as input to the KD protocol by a random session key sk ′ B in all of the sessions. Using similar arguments, one can prove the following lemma.
Experiment Exp 3 . In this experiment, we replace the MAC key k m obtained via the key distribution protocol with a random key in all of the sessions involving both A and B. According to the following lemma, the difference between the success probability of the adversary A between the current and previous experiments is at most that of breaking the security of the key distribution scheme KD protocol among A, B, and S.
Proof: The proof of of this lemma uses a sequence of hybrid experiments V j , where j is an index between 0 and q s = (q exe + q kd ). Let i represent the i-th session involving honest users A and B. We define the hybrid experiment V j as follows. If i ≤ j, then the MAC key k m is chosen uniformly at random as in experiment Exp 3 . If i > j, then the MAC key k m is computed via the key distribution protocol as in experiment Exp 2 . Note that experiments V 0 and V qs are equivalent to experiments Exp 2 and Exp 3 , respectively. Let P j be the probability of the event Succ in Experiment V j . Since P 0 = Pr[ qs j=1 P j − P j−1 . Thus, to prove the present lemma, it suffices to show that P j − P j−1 is at most Adv ftg−kd KD (t, 1, 0). To do so, we assume the existence of a distinguisher A 3,j for experiments V j−1 and V j and we show how to build an adversary A j kd against the KD protocol that has a success probability similar to that of A 3,i and that asks queries to its Send oracle with respect to a single session only.
The description of A j kd is as follows. As in previous cases, A j kd starts by choosing a bit b uniformly at random and selecting the passwords for all users in the system according to the distribution of D. Next, A j kd starts running A 3,j , giving it the passwords for all the malicious clients in the system. Then, for the first j − 1 sessions, A j kd simulates all oracles exactly as in experiment Exp 3 . Likewise, for the last q s − j sessions, A j kd simulates all oracles exactly as in experiment Exp 2 . For the j-th session, instead of choosing the inputs for the key distribution protocol, A j kd simulates the SendClient, SendServer, and Execute oracles of A 3,j using the Send oracle for the KD protocol. Moreover, A j kd also makes a Test query with respect to this session to obtain a keyk m and it uses this key to simulate the remainder of the GPAKE protocol of the j-th session. kd , one can easily see that the probability that A i kd outputs 1 when its Test oracle returns real keys is exactly the probability that A 3,j correctly guesses the hidden bit b in experiment V j−1 (i.e., P j−1 ). Similarly, the probability that A i kd outputs 1 when its Test oracle returns random keys is exactly the probability that A 3,j correctly guesses the hidden bit b in experiment V j (i.e., P j−1 ). The lemma follows by noticing that A i kd has time-complexity at most t, that it asks queries to its Send oracle with respect to a single session only, and that it asks no Reveal queries. 4 . In this experiment, we modify the oracle instances as follows. If the adversary asks a SendClient query containing a new pair message-tag not previously generated by an oracle, then we consider the MAC tag invalid and force the instance in question (which received a forged message) to terminate without accepting. As the following lemma shows, the difference between the current and previous experiments should be negligible if we use a secure MAC scheme. 

Proof:
The proof of this lemma also uses hybrid arguments in the same way as in the proof of Lemma 6.3. The total number of hybrids in this case is q ake , since Execute queries do not need to be taken into account in this case. In hybrid V i , where 0 ≤ i ≤ q ake , queries in the first i sessions are answered as in experiment Exp 4 and all other queries are answered as in experiment Exp 3 . Let A 4,i be a distinguisher for hybrids V i and V i−1 . Using A 4,i , we can build an adversary for the MAC scheme as follows.
For the first i − 1 sessions, the adversary A i mac will choose random values for the MAC key and is therefore able to perfect simulate the oracles given to A 4,i . In the i-th session, A i mac makes use of its MAC generation and verification oracles to answer queries from A 4,i . If A 4,i asks a SendClient containing a pair message-tag not previously generated by A i mac , then A i mac halts and outputs that pair as its forgery. If no such pair is generated, we output a failure indication. For all remaining sessions, A i mac uses the actual MAC keys obtained via the key distribution scheme as in experiment Exp 3 to answer queries from A 4,i .
Let F be the event in which a message-tag pair is considered invalid in hybrid V i but valid in hybrid V i−1 . Notice that Pr[F ] is at most the probability that an adversary A i mac can forge a new message-tag pair under a chosen-message attack. Since A i mac has time-complexity t and makes at most two queries to its MAC generation oracle (to answer the SendClient queries) and no queries to its verification oracle, we have that Pr[F ] ≤ Adv suf−cma MAC (t, 2, 0). Moreover, since the two hybrids proceed identically until F occurs, we have Pr[
. The lemma follows from the fact that there are at most q ake hybrids. 5 . In this experiment, we change the simulation of SendClient(U i , m) queries pertaining the last two flows of GPAKE as well as the simulation of the Test(U i ) oracle to avoid relying on the knowledge of the values x and y used to compute the answer to these queries. More precisely, instead of choosing the values of x and y directly, we assume that we are given a random DDH triple (X, Y, Z), where X = g x , Y = g y , and Z = g xy . Then, using (X, Y, Z) and the classical random self-reducibility of the Diffie-Hellman problem, we show how to simulate the above-mentioned oracles for all those sessions involving two honest users. All other queries are simulated as in experiment Exp 4 .
Experiment Exp
The behavior of our simulation in this experiment is as follows. Experiment Exp 5 is identical to experiment Exp 4 , except that we apply the following special rules when dealing with Test(U i ) and SendClient(U i , m) queries for the last two flows of GPAKE where U i and its intended partner are honest users:
R1: When processing a SendClient(A i , Start) query, the simulator selects two random values a 0 and x 0 in Zq, computes X 0 = X a 0 g x 0 , and stores (a 0 , x 0 , X 0 ) in a table X .
R2:
When processing a SendClient(B j , (X 0 , m 0 )) query in the last message of the protocol,
• if the element X 0 has been computed by our simulator and is thus stored in the table X , then our simulator answers this query by choosing two random values b 0 , y 0 • if the elements X 0 is not stored in the table X , then the simulation proceeds as in experiment Exp 4 (i.e., it halts without accepting).
R3:
When processing a Test(U i ) query, where U i and its intended partner are instances of a honest user that have accepted, then the simulator answers this query using the value Z 0 that it has pre-computed. We notice that, since active attacks against such instances have been ruled out in experiment Exp 4 , the simulator always knows the correct value Z 0 for the session key.
In order to analyze the differences between the current and the previous experiments, we first observe that, since MAC forgeries have been dealt with in experiment Exp 4 , the second case of rule R2 will always cause the user instance involved in that query to not accept. Second, for all those sessions involving instances of users A and B, the Test(U i ) queries are always correctly answered. As a result, it is clear that experiments Exp 4 and Exp 5 are equivalent, since we have consistently replaced one set of random variables by another set of identically distributed random variables. In particular, Pr[Succ 4 ] = Pr[Succ 5 ].
Experiment Exp 6 . The current experiment is similar to the previous one, except that all rules are computed using a triple (X, Y, Z) sampled from a random distribution (g x , g y , g z ), intead of a DDH triple. As the following lemma shows, the difference between the current and previous experiments should be negligible if DDH is hard in G.
Proof: Let A be an attacker that breaks the indistinguishability experiment of GPAKE with a different advantage in Experiment Exp 6 than in Experiment Exp 5 . We can build an adversary A ddh for the DDH problem in G as follows. Let (X, Y, Z) be the input given to A ddh . A ddh first selects a bit b at random and then starts running A. If A asks a SendClient, Execute, or Test query, then A ddh computes its output exactly as in the previous experiment but using the triple (X, Y, Z) that it had received as input. Let b ′ be the output of A. If b ′ = b, then A ddh returns 1 or 0, otherwise.
Let us now analyze the success probability of A ddh . Clearly, when the triple (X, Y, Z) is a true Diffie-Hellman triple, A ddh runs A exactly as in experiment Exp 5 and thus the probability that A ddh outputs 1 is exactly Pr[Succ 5 ]. On the other hand, when (X, Y, Z) is a random triple, A ddh runs A exactly as in experiment Exp 6 and thus the probability that A ddh outputs 1 is exactly Pr[Succ 6 ]. The lemma follows from the fact that A ddh has time-complexity at most t + 8(q exe + q ake )τ e , due to the additional time for the computations of the random self-reducibility.
Due to the random self-reducibility property of the Diffie-Hellman problem, all the sessions keys Z 0 used to answer Test queries in experiment Exp 6 are randomly and independently distributed in G. As a result, no information on the hidden bit b used by the Test oracle is leaked to the adversary and thus Pr[Succ 6 ] = 1 2 . This result combined with the previous lemmas yields the result in Theorem 5.1.
Key privacy. The proof of key privacy uses arguments similar to those used in experiments Exp 5 and Exp 6 in the proof of indistinguishability of GPAKE. Let A kp be an adversary against the key privacy of GPAKE with time-complexity at most t, and asking at most q exe queries to its Execute oracle, q test queries to its TestPair oracle, and q ake queries to SendClient oracle with respect to the final MAC-based authenticated key exchange protocol. Using A kp , we can build an adversary A ddh for the DDH problem in G as follows.
Let (X, Y, Z) be the input given to A ddh . A ddh first chooses the passwords for all users in the system according to the distribution of D. It also chooses a bit b at random that is used to answer queries to the TestPair oracle. It then starts running A kp giving all the password of all users to it. Since A ddh knows the password of all users, it can easily answer queries made by A kp . However, in order to use A kp to help it solve the DDH problem, A ddh will use the classical random self-reducibility of the Diffie-Hellman problem to introduce its input triple in the answers to SendClient, Execute, and TestPair queries with respect to the last two flows of GPAKE.
To simulate the Execute oracle, we simply use the passwords that we have chosen and proceed as in the actual protocol, except when computing the last two flows of GPAKE. For these flows, we proceed as in simulation of the SendClient oracle described below.
The simulation of the SendClient and TestPair are as follows:
R1: When processing a SendClient(A i , Start) query, A ddh selects two random values a 0 and x 0 in Zq, computes X 0 = X a 0 g x 0 , and stores (a 0 , x 0 , X 0 ) in a table X .
R2:
When processing a SendClient(B j , (X 0 , m 0 )) query,
• if the element X 0 has been computed by A ddh and is thus stored in the table X , then • if the elements X 0 is not stored in the table X , then A ddh proceeds with the simulation as it would in a real attack. We would like to observe here that the second case of rule R2 has no influence over TestPair queries, since the latter can only be asked to pair of oracle instances which share the same key. This is because even though the instance involved in the SendClient may itself accept, its partner would not be an oracle instance. Hence, a TestPair query involving this instance would always return the invalid symbol ⊥.
In order to analyze the success probability of A ddh , first consider the case in which the triple (X, Y, Z) is a true Diffie-Hellman triple. Then, in this case, one can see that simulation of the A kp oracles is perfect. Hence, the probability that A ddh outputs 1 is exactly . On the other hand, when (X, Y, Z) is a random triple, the keys Z 0 used to answer TestPair queries are all random and independent as a result of the random selfreducibility property of the Diffie-Hellman problem. Hence, no information on b is leaked through TestPair queries and the probability that A ddh outputs 1 is exactly 1 2 in this case. The proof of Theorem 5.2 follows from the fact that A ddh has time-complexity at most t + 8(q exe + q ake )τ e , due to the additional time for the computations of the random self-reducibility.
Concluding remarks
Authentication. In order to take explicit authentication into account, one can easily extend our model using definitions similar to those of Bellare et al. [7] for unilateral or mutual authentication. In their definition, an adversary is said to break authentication if it succeeds in making any oracle instance terminate the protocol without a partner oracle. Likewise, one could also use their generic transformation to enhance our generic construction so that it provides unilateral or mutual authentication. The drawback of using their generic transformation is that it requires the random oracle model. However, standard solutions based on pseudorandom function families that do not rely on the random oracle model can also be used in this case.
More efficient constructions. Even though the generic construction presented in this paper is quite practical, more efficient solutions are possible. For instance, one possible modification is to replace the key distribution phase of our generic construction by a single round of communication in which the server encrypts the MAC key using authenticated encryption scheme. Another possible improvement to our generic construction would be to combine the key distribution and the final key exchange phases into a single phase. One can easily think of different solutions for this scenario that are more efficient that the one we give. Nevertheless, the overall gain in efficiency that could be obtained with these extensions would most likely not be very significant since the most costly part of these two phases, the Diffie-Hellman protocol, seems to be necessary if key privacy with respect to the server is to be achieved. As a result, we believe that the best way to improve the efficiency of generic construction is to adapt specific solutions in the 2-party model to the 3-party model, instead of treating these schemes as black boxes.
